In this paper, we study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations problem, which given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching, asks whether a stable matching for the instance is reachable by a sequence of divorce operations as introduced by Tamura [6] . We show that for incomplete preferences with ties, Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations is NP-complete.
Introduction
In the Stable Marriage problem, we are given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , which we refer to as to the set of men and the set of women, respectively. Each agent from either set has a preference list (that may be incomplete and contain ties) on the agents from the opposite set. The goal is to search for a stable matching M , that is, a set M of disjoint pairs of agents such that the agents in each pair find each other acceptable and no unmatched pair is a blocking pair with respect to M . Herein, a blocking pair {u, w} with respect to a matching M is a pair not in M such that the following is fulfilled.
1. u is either unmatched or prefers to be with w than with the agent matched by M , and 2. w is either unmatched or prefers to be with u than with the agent matched by M . In this paper, we study the computational complexity of a variant of the Stable Marriage problem, called Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations, which, given an instance of Stable Marriage I = (U, W, ( x ) x∈U ∪W ) and a matching M 0 , asks whether there is a stable matching M for I which is reachable from M 0 . Here, a matching M is reachable from M if there is a sequence (p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p −1 ) of pairs of agents, where for each pair p i = {u i , w i }, 0 ≤ i ≤ − 1, the following holds.
• M i+1 is a matching for I and is recursively defined as
• the pair p i is blocking matching M i , and
For a matching M and a pair p = {u, w} of agents such that u and w are matched under M , we use b-inter(M, p) to denote the set resulting from M by replacing the pairs {u, M (u)} and {M (w), w} in matching M with {u, w} and {M (w), M (u)}, while keeping the other pairs unchanged. Formally,
If p is blocking M and the set b-inter(M, p) remains a matching, then the above operation is called b-interchange by p for M [6] . The problem that we study in this paper is defined as follows.
Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations
Input: A Stable Marriage instance (possibly with ties and incomplete preferences) I = (U, W, ( x ) x∈U ∪W ), a matching M 0
Question: Does I admit a stable matching which is reachable from M 0 ?
Example 1. For an illustration, let us consider the following instance from Tamura [6] , with four agents on each side, i.e., U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 }. 
Let M 0 be a matching with M 0 = {{u 1 , w 1 }, {u 2 , w 4 }, {u 3 , w 3 }, {u 4 , w 2 }}. It has two blocking pairs p = {u 2 , w 2 } and q = {u 4 , w 4 }. Using either for a b-interchange leads to the stable (in fact the man-optimal) matching M = {{u i , w i }} i∈ [4] .
Knuth [3] was the first to ask whether, given a divorce graph, there is a path to a sink from every vertex that corresponds to a matching in a Stable Marriage instance. The divorce graph for a Stable Marriage instance with n men and n women is a directed graph which has a vertex for each possible matching between the men and the women, and has an arc (u, v) from a vertex u to another vertex v if there is a blocking pair p for the matching M u represented by vertex u such that performing the b-interchange by p results in a matching M v represented by vertex v, i.e., M v = b-inter(M u , p). By definition, every sink in the divorce graph corresponds to a stable matching. Knuth [3] observed that the divorce graph may contain cycles so that not every path from a vertex leads to sink. Gusfield and Irving [2] asked whether the divorce graph may have some specific structure that helps in identifying a path that leads to a sink.
Tamura [6] provided a construction that, for each number n ≥ 4, produces an instance with n agents on each side for which there is a matching that does not lead to a stable matching by performing any b-interchanges. This instance with n = 4 is depicted in Example 1 (also see [6, Fig. 4] ). If we start with matching N 0 = {{u 1 , w 1 }, {u 2 , w 2 }, {u 3 , w 4 }, {u 4 , w 3 }}, then no matter what b-interchanges we perform, we will never reach a stable matching. For more details, please refer to the work of Tamura [6] . He also provided an algorithm that transforms an arbitrary matching into a stable one by using operations that are not only b-interchanges. His algorithm does not necessarily run in polynomial time. Independently, Tan and Su [7] provided a different instance with four agents on each side where there is a matching for which no b-interchange path leads to a stable matching. They also showed that for any instance with at most three agents on each side, an arbitrary matching can always be transformed into a stable one by using only b-interchanges. Similarly, they also provided an algorithm that transforms an arbitrary matching into a stable one while using not exclusively b-interchanges. For instance, they do not require the "divorcees" to be matched together as we do in this paper. See Roth and Vate [5] , Cheng [1] and [4, Section 2.6] for more details in this setting.
NP-hardness for Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations with Ties and Incomplete Preferences
In this section, we show that transforming an arbitrary matching into a stable matching via binterchanges is NP-hard.
Theorem 1. For incomplete preferences with ties, Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce
Operations is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from Independent Set, which, given an n-vertex graph G = (V, E) with vertex set V and edge set E, and a number k ∈ N, asks whether G admits a k-vertex independent set, a vertex subset V ⊆ V with k pairwise non-adjacent vertices. Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and E = {e 1 , . . . , e m }. Our Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations instance consists of two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , with U = V ∪E∪F ∪A∪X ∪C and
In total, there are 4m + 2n agents on each side. We will construct the preferences and an initial matching M 0 such that each stable matching reachable from M 0 must match a vertex agent v i to someone from S ∪ T , and the k agents that are matched to S correspond to an independent set. In the following, we use round parentheses to express that the agents listed inside the parentheses are tied as partners, and square brackets to refer to an arbitrary but fixed strict order.
Preferences for W .
y j : x j e j c j ,
, where e j = {v, v } ∈ E.
Initial matching M 0 . To complete the construction we set the initial matching M 0 as follows.
For each e j ∈ E with e j = {v, v }, select an arbitrary but fixed order for (v, v ) and let M 0 (x j ) = e v j and M 0 (c j
Before we continue with the construction, we observe the following properties that each stable matching reachable from M 0 must satisfy. Claim 1. Let M be a stable matching for our constructed instance which is reachable from M 0 . Then, M satisfies the following properties:
For each v i ∈ V with M (v i ) ∈ S and for each edge e j with e j = {v i , v }, it holds that M (e j ) = e
Proof. Since M is stable, the first four statements are straight-forward to verify. As for the fifth statement, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an agent s ∈ S such that M (s) / ∈ V , implying that s is unmatched under M . By the preferences of the vertex agents and by the stability of M it must hold that there exists a vertex agent
for some edge e j with v i ∈ e j . Since M is a stable matching reachable from M 0 , by definition, there exists a sequence ξ = (M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M ) of matchings and a sequence (p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p −1 ) of blocking pairs such that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ − 1,
is a matching for our constructed instance, and • the pair p i is blocking M i , and 
However, no agent from {e j , f j , c j , x j } finds any agent from Now, we show that (G = (V, E), k) is a yes-instance for Independent Set if and only if M 0 can be transformed into a stable matching by only performing b-interchanges, i.e., there exists a stable matching which is reachable from M 0 .
Correctness of the construction. For the "if" direction, let M be a stable matching reachable from M 0 . We claim that V = {v i | M (v i ) ∈ S} forms an independent set of size k for G. First of all, by Claim 1(5) there are exactly k vertex agents that have partners in S. Thus, |V | = k. That V is an independent set follows from Claim 1 (6) .
For the "only if" direction, let V be an independent set of size k with V = {v r 1 , v r 2 , . . . , v r k } and V \ V = {v z 1 , v z 2 , . . . , v z n−k }. We perform several stages of b-interchanges in order to obtain a stable matching.
1.
Since {v r i , s i } is a blocking M i−1 and M (v r i ) = b r i and M (s i ) = a i can be matched to each other, it follows that M i is indeed a matching. Thus, M i is obtained by performing a b-interchange by {v r i , s i } for M i−1 . After performing these b-interchanges, we obtain a matching M k for which no blocking pair involves an agent from S. See the following figure for an illustration.
Since {v z i , t i } is a blocking M k+i−1 and M (v z i ) = b z i and M (t i ) = a i+k can be matched to each other, it follows that M k+i is indeed a matching. Thus, M k+i is obtained by performing a b-interchange by {v z i , t i } for M k+i−1 . After performing these b-interchanges, we obtain a matching M n for which no blocking pair involves an agent from S ∪ T . See the following figure for an illustration.
3. For each edge e j ∈ E, assume that e j = {v, v } such that M 0 (x j ) = e v j and M 0 (c j ) = e v j . M n admits the following blocking pairs {e j , e v j }, {f j , e v j }, {e j , e v j }, {f j , e v j }, {x j , y j }, {c j , d j }. Then, do the following.
-If v / ∈ V , then since both {e j , e v j } and {x j , y j } are blocking matching M n+2j−2 we let M n+2j−1 = M n+2j−2 − {e j , y j } − {x j , e v j } + {e j , e v j } + {x j , y j }. Afterwards, in M n+2j−1 no blocking pair involves an agent from {e j , e v j , x j , y j }. Both {f j , e v j } and {c j , d j } are still blocking matching M n+2j−1 . Thus, let -If v ∈ V , implying that v / ∈ V (because V is an independent set and v is adjacent to v ), then since pair {e j , e v j } is blocking matching M n+2j−2 we let M n+2j−1 = M n+2j−2 − {e j , y j } − {c j , e v j } + {e j , e v j } + {c j , y j }. After performing this b-interchange, no blocking pair involves an agent from {e j , e v j }. Pairs {f j , e v j }, {x j , y j }, and {c j , d j } are still blocking matching
In M n+2j no blocking pair involves an agent from {e j , e v j , x j , y j , c j , d j }. See the following figure for an illustration.
We have just shown, during the construction of M n+2m , that M n+2m results from performing a sequence of b-interchanges on M 0 . We claim that M n+2m is a stable matching. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that p = {u, w} is a blocking pair of M n+2m with u ∈ U and w ∈ W . By the above reasoning, no unmatched pair of M n+2m that involves an agent from A ∪ E ∪ F ∪ X ∪ C could be blocking M n+2m as each of them has already been matched to its most preferred partner. Thus, if u ∈ A∪E ∪F ∪X ∪C, p will not be blocking M n+2m . Assume that u = v i for some v i ∈ V . By construction, M n+2m (v i ) ∈ S ∪ T . If M n+2m (v i ) ∈ T , then p is not blocking M n+2m as v i has already been matched to one of its most preferred partners. If M n+2m (v i ) ∈ S, meaning that v i ∈ V , then w ∈ E(v i ) as no agent in T is involved in a blocking pair; recall that w is the other agent which forms with u a blocking pair. Assume that w is some agent e v i j with e j ∈ E and v i ∈ e j . Let v be another endpoint of e j ; note that v / ∈ V . By our construction of M n+2m which matches e v i j (resp. e v j ) to the same partner as matchings M n+2j−1 and M n+2j do, it follows that M n+2m (e v i j ) = e j . However, e v i j has already been matched to its most preferred partner, and thus cannot be involved in a blocking pair-a contradiction.
Open questions
Our hardness reduction leads to several open questions. 
